Author(s)

Klingelhöfer, Jan


Abstract

I analyze the interaction between post-election lobbying and the voting decisions of forward-looking voters. The existing literature has shown that in models with ciitzen candidates form a dispersed distribution of preferences, lobbying has no influence on implemented policy. In my model with ideological parties, lobbying is shown to have an effect on policy. In terms of welfare, I show that the median voter and the majority of voters are often better off with lobbying.


Klingelhöfer, J.: Lobbying and Elections, in: Bulletin of Economic Research (forthcoming) 


 

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