Take a look at our conferences and seminar series

March 29th - 31st 2019

 

From March 29th to 31st 2019, the Center for Financial Development and Stability (CFDS) at Henan University and the International Network for Economic Research (INFER) will organize their 5th annual Workshop on Applied Macroeconomics hosted by Henan University.

June 23rd and 24th 2018

On June 23rd and 24th 2018 the Center for Financial Development and Stability (CFDS) at Henan University and the International Network for Economic Research (INFER), will organize their 4th annual Workshop on Applied Macroeconomics hosted by Henan University.

Kick-Off Meeting of the Center for Financial Development and Stability at Henan University

October 18th, 2017
School of Economics - Henan University

 

On October 18th, 2017, the Center for Financial Development and Stability at Henan University – short CFDS – successfully held its Kick-Off meeting.

The director of the CFDS – Makram El-Shagi, Dean of the School of Economics – Song Bingtao, and Mao Liqun – Vice Dean of the International Affairs Office- gave the opening speeches and together uncover the centers plaque. The Center members welcomed the President of the Halle Institute of Economic Research (IWH) – Prof. Dr. Reint E. Gropp and Prof. Dr. Jarko Fidrmuc, who holds the Chair of International Politics at Zeppelin University in Friedrichshafen, Germany, during the Kick-Off Meeting. The CFDS will start research cooperation’s with the IWH as well as Zeppelin University and was honored to welcome both professors for the kick-off meeting.

Date and Time: October 18th, 2019, 10:00 - 11:30 am

Room: Old Campus, Dongliuzhai

Abstract

A relationship between lying behavior and social peferences has often been proposed in explaining patterns of lying aversion (ex. Erat and Gneezy, 2011; Houser, Vetter and Winter, 2012; Maggian and Villeval, 2015). We assess subjects’ lying tendencies in the analogous scenarios using a novel multinomial version of a "mind cheating game" (Garbarino, Slonim and Villeval, 2017), which allows different degrees of lying and is independent of social image and reputation concerns. Our study allows us to observe how individual preferences over fairness and efficiency are associated with the willingness to lie for one's self and others. Selfish and spiteful lies are prevalent among those with strong spiteful preferences in the allocation task, while those subjects with efficiency-oriented preferences tell efficient lies on behalf of others. However, lying on behalf of fairness concerns among those with strong preference for fairness is less apparent in the data. The empirical patterns suggest that individuals with strong efficiency preference may be more likely to lie for fairness concerns, while those with strong fairness preferences may be more likely to lie out of self-interest.

About the Speaker

Jie Zheng is Associate Professor in the Department of Economics and Executive Associate Director of the Tsinghua Economic Science and Policy Experimental Laboratory at Tsinghua University. His research areas are Economic Theory, Information Economics, Experimental Economics, Behavioral Economics, Matching Theory, Financial Economics, Industrial Organization, and the Chinese Economy. His research was published in many well known journals, among them Review of International Economics, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organisation and American Economic Review: Papers & Proceedings.

 

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